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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
an interpretation or application of the collective bargaining contract
to arbitration."'
ROBERT M. WESTBERG
State Power to Regulate Labor Regulations. Plaintiff, who was wrongfully expelled
from a labor union, brought an action in the state court for reinstatement and for
damages measured by loss of wages. A judgment for the plaintiff was rendered in
Mahoney v. S.U.P., 43 Wn.2d 874, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953). On rehearing [145 Wash.
Dec. 422, 275 P.2d 440 (1954)], the court held that the Taft-Hartley Act [61 Stat.
136 et seq., 29 U.S.C. ed., § 141 et seq.] has precluded the state from granting such com-
pensatory and injunctive relief based on unfair labor activities. The court further held,
however, that the state does have jurisdiction to order reinstatement as a means of pro-
tecting the employee's property and contract rights as a member of the union. The case
is more fully discussed in Wollett, Taft-Hartley and State Power to Regulate Labor
Relations, 30 WASH. L. Rsv. 1, 9-14 (1955).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Zoning. During the past year, two decisions were handed down by the
Washington court, both of which reversed the trial court findings of
fact and resulting conclusions of law on problems involving local
zoning ordinances. In Coleman v. Walla Walla,1 the plaintiff owned a
large house near the Whitman College campus in a zone designated
as "Residential Single Family District" by city ordinances. The
ordinance contained the usual and necessary constitutional provision
that pre-existing nonconforming uses could be continued Plaintiff
proposed to sell the building, which she had previously used as a
rooming house, for use as a fraternity house.' On her suit for declara-
tory relief, the trial court sitting without a jury found the proposed
use of the building was merely a permissible continuation of a pre-
existing nonconforming use. This conclusion was primarily substan-
tiated by two of the findings of fact: "V. no major alterations were
proposed or are needed to utilize the building as a fraternity house."'
"VI. no change in the use of said premises is contemplated except a
change in the denomination .... I
On appeal by the city, the Supreme Court extensively reviewed these
and other findings of fact along with the conclusions of law which were
predicated upon them, and the majority of the court concluded the
744 Wn.2d 808, 821, 271 P.2d 689, 696.
144 Wn.2d 296, 266 P.2d 1034 (1954).
2 U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. ART. I, § 3.
3 At the time of the suit, plaintiff rented rooms to thirteen students all of whom were
members of the same fraternity.




preponderance of the evidence was contrary to the findings of the trial
judge. As the basis of its decision denying declaratory relief, the court
strictly applied the rule that one type of nonconforming use cannot be
converted into another kind of nonconforming use, nor can the pre-
existing use be substantially altered without violating the purpose and
intent of the zoning ordinance. Of the various cases cited as authority
in the majority opinion, none is very closely in point, although most of
them do set forth general propositions and rules for applying zoning
ordinances to certain fact patterns. State ex rel. Miller v. CainP indi-
cates that the policy of the law, as conceived by the Washington court,
favors strict confinement of nonconforming uses. The majority opinion
quotes at some length from McQuillen' and cites from this source the
general rule that a prior nonconforming use "cannot be changed into
some other kind of nonconforming use."8 In citing this statement the
court apparently did not choose to include as a part of the rule the
sentence which immediately follows and elucidates it: "Leastwise, it
cannot rightfully be changed into a nonconforming use that is sub-
stantially or entirely different."' (Quaere whether this is an intentional
selection which commits Washington to a stricter rule as to changes in
nonconforming uses than does the general rule as posited by Mc-
Quillen?)
The trial court concluded that the intended purchasers planned no
major alterations, nor would any be necessary for them to utilize the
building as a fraternity house. On extensive review of the record, the
majority of the appellate court found that alterations would of
necessity be required in order to provide adequate facilities for the
proposed fraternity house. It is significant to note that the majority
did not expressly state that major or substantial alterations would be
necessary, yet, according to McQuillen, as a general rule the only
alterations of nonconforming uses that are prohibited by zoning laws
are those which involve substantial or structural changes." It is also
generally accepted that the owner of a pre-existing nonconforming use
can engage in other uses normally incidental, auxiliary and collateral
to the nonconforming use.1 The court did not discuss this-problem
although it seems clearly possible to hold that a fraternity house and
6 40 Wn.2d 216, 242 P2d 505 (1952).
7 8 MCQUILLFN, MU NICIPA CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1950).
8 8 Id. § 25.202.
9 Ibid.
10 8 Id. §§ 25.205, 25.206 and 25259.
118 Id. § 25209 and cases cited.
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a rooming house are not such auxiliary and collateral uses as come
within the exception to the rule.
The dissenter felt extremely reluctant to overrule the trial judge in
his findings of fact and resulting conclusions. His opinion advocates a
far less strict rule be applied to zoning problems of this sort: ". . . an
owner of nonconforming property may not be interfered with if he
desires to use it in a somewhat different way than it was used when the
ordinance was enacted if such use is not substantially and essentially
a departure from the character of the nonconforming use excepted
from the operation of such ordinance."12 While the position of the
dissenter has some appeal, it must be conceded that Washington
authority supporting this argument is extremely scant, whereas the
Miller case 3 supports the majority conclusion that nonconforming uses
should be strictly confined.
In the case of Hauser v. Arness,1 ' 38 plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin
defendants from using their own tideland lots in Kitsap County for
log dumping and booming operations. The plaintiffs contended (1) that
the land in question was zoned as residential property, and (2) that the
log dump was a general nuisance. By way of reply, the defendants
contended, and it was an undisputed fact as shown in the appellate
record, that the actual dumping and booming operation took place
entirely on the defendants' tidelands, which were unclassified by the
county zoning ordinances. Thus, the defendants were at most guilty
of driving their trucks across their own zoned property in order to
reach and dump on their own unzoned property. The trial court con-
cluded that the operation was not a general nuisance, but that it was
in violation of the county zoning ordinance in that the classified upland
lots and the unclassified abutting tideland lots were being used as a
single unit for the purpose of operating a log dump. The defendants
alone brought the appeal.
In reaching a decision on this novel and extremely complex factual
problem, the Supreme Court noted the fact that neither party cited
any case from any jurisdiction which was of assistance in arriving at
a solution. However, the court itself did unearth one authority, the
Rolling Green Golf Club Case,1" which dealt with somewhat similar
12 Note 1 supra, at 304, 266 P2d at 1038.
13 Note 6 supra.
14 44 Wn2d 358, 267 P.2d 691 (1954).
15 374 Pa2d 450, 97 A.2nd 523 (1953). This decision, having been rendered subse-
quent to the trial of the instant case, was, of course, not available to counsel or the
trial court in deciding it.
[M[AY
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facts and prbolems. In the Golf Club Case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court permitted the club to construct a private road across its own
tract, even though the tract was residentially zoned. This was done in
spite of the fact that the club already had access to another public
road, the court holding that: "The right of a property owner to have
(or build) a road over his own land to connect with a public road has
been recognized for centuries as one of his fundamental inalienable
rights.""
In neither the Golf Club Case nor the instant case does the zoning
ordinance expressly forbid the use of the classified land as a driveway
to reach the unclassified land. But the Washington court, not content
to rest its decision solely on this point, went on to consider whether or
not the ordinance "by clear and necessary implication"' forbids the
use as a driveway. [Italics supplied.] As a byproduct of its examina-
tion of the ordinance in question, the court reiterated several of the
applicable rules of statutory construction and constitutional interpreta-
tion. With two constructions available, the court chose the one avoiding
the question of constitutionality of the ordinance. 8 The decision then
announced for the first time in Washington what was denominated "the
correct rule of interpretation of zoning ordinances," 9 a rule set forth
in the Maryland case of Landay v. McWilliams as follows: "Such*
ordinances are in derogation of the common law right .to so use private
property as to realize its highest utility, and while they should be
liberally construed to accomplish their plain purpose and intent, they
should not be extended by implication to cases not clearly within the
scope of the purpose and intent manifest in their language. 2 0 Roughly
this same rule was declared in the Golf Club Case," and it is apparently
the modem weight of authority although there is considerable conflict
among the cases."
It is worthy of note that in the Hauser case the court took cognizance
of the fact that logging is a lawful and extremely valuable industry in
this state, one that is not generally held to constitute a nuisance unless
the use clearly interferes with the reasonable and comfortable enjoy-
ment of adjoining landowners. The court concluded from the evidence
16 Id. at 526. The court cited in support of this proposition: 2 BLACKSTONe'S Co-
MENTARIE 35; 3 KENT COMMENTARIES 420; and two Pennsylvania decisions.
17 Note 14 supra, at 366, 267 P.2d at 696.
28 Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 21 Wn.2d 261, 150 P2d 839 (1944).
10 Note 14 supra, at 370, 267 P.2d at 698.
20 173 Md. 460, 196 A. 293, 296 (1938).
21 Note 15 supra.
22 8 McQuILT N, op. cit. supra, §§ 25.72, 25.73.
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that "to conduct their business profitably independent loggers must
have some means of access to tide water in order to compete with
others... .3 This approach to a nuisance problem involving a para-
mount industry is in line with the policy of this court as announced
in various other decisions.24
In comparing and contrasting these two recent zoning cases, it might
appear at first blush that they are inconsistent. A closer examination
reveals, however, that, while they are factually quite different, both
cases can be decided by application of the rule laid down in the Hauser
case, a rule which is called the correct rule for construing and inter-
preting zoning ordinances. Thus, in the Coleman case, the court
liberally construed the ordinance in order to accomplish its plain
purpose and intent. The logical corollary of this rule of liberal con-
struction is the rule of strict application of the terms of the ordinance,
to the end that one type of nonconforming use shall not be converted
into another type. This approach to zoning problems clearly indicates
the Washington policy of strict confinement of nonconforming uses.
The Hauser case presented quite a different problem, for there the
challenged use was not a nonconforming one and was in fact not clearly
within the prohibition of the ordinance. In order to prohibit this use,
-the court would have had to extend the zoning statute by implication
to a case which was not clearly within the scope and intent of the
ordinance. This the court was unwilling to do in view of the constitu-
tional question that such a construction would raise.
DOUGLAS R. HENDEL
Term of Officer Appointed to Fill Vacancy. In State ex rel. Welsh v. Langenbach,
44 Wn2d 371, 267 P.2d 715 (1954), respondent was appointed by the mayor to fill an
unexpired four-year term as city attorney, the vacancy having been created when the
elected officer was called to active military duty. With two years of the term remaining,
the successor to the mayor ousted respondent and appointed relator to the position.
Following RCW 73.16.040, the court ruled the person first appointed was entitled to
hold office during the absence of the elected officer, or until the expiration of the four
year term, which ever occurred first.
Municipal Departments and Officers. In Augustine v. Board of Police Pen.sion Fund,
44 Wn2d 732, 270 P.2d 475 (1954), defendant had contracted with a local hospital to
furnish hospital care to policemen. Plaintiff was injured and chose to receive care
from another hospital. Pursuant to RCW 41.20.120, he applied for payment of hospital
23 Note 14 supra, at 369, 267 P.2d at 698.
24 Cf. Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306 (1924), Matt-
son v. Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 282 Pac. 848 (1929), Powell v. Superior
Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn.2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
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and doctor bills from the fund, -and defendant denied the application. The statute pro-
vides: "Whenever any member of the police'department . is confined to any hospital
or to his home. . . the board shall pay the necessary hospital, care and nursing ex-
penses ...." Held: the defendant acted illegally in ruling that the benefits to which
plaintiff was entitled were limited as a matter of law to those provided under the
contract between the defendant and the Jocal hospital.
Municipal Departments and Officers-Examination and Promotion. Stoor v. City of
Seattle, 44 Wn2d 405, 267 P2d 902 (1954), was an action to annul an oral examination
given to plaintiffs by the civil service commission. The city charter required written
competitive examination except where tests of manual or professional skill are neces-
sary. Defendant contended the oral examination was necessary to and did test the
professional skill of plaintiffs. The majority of the court ruled a captaincy in the fire
department is a profession and thus the city charter permits oral testing. As a problem'
of first instance, the majority decided competitive tests need not be strictly objective as
long as all candidates take the same tests and are in competition with one another.
Following the prevailing practice in problems of this sort, the court allowed the civil
service commission wide discretion in the examination and promotion of candidates.
Schools and School Districts--Teachers' Reappointment. In State ex rel. Welch v.
Seattle School Dirtrict No. 1, 145 Wash. Dec. 6, 272 P2d 617 (1954), the school
district sent relator a registered letter advising her that her existing contract to teach
would not be renewed. The letter was never delivered. Relator demanded issuance of
her contract under RCW 28.67.070. Upon refusal, she appealed to the State Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction who ruled she was entitled to the contract. Relator in
this action secured a writ of mandate to compel reinstatement. Held: the contract was
conclusively presumed to have been renewed pursuant to RCW 28.67.010. The school
district could have appealed the State Superintendents decision, but since no appeal
was taken, "the decision became final under the purview of RCW.28.88.040."
Zoning. State ex rel Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 145 Wash. Dec. 460, 275 P.2d 899
(1954). Relator made a formal application to the city for a permit to construct business
buildings on a part of his land zoned for business. Defendant denied the application,
asserting relator had made no provision for off street parking as provided by city
ordinance. Relator leased a tract of land which complied with all the standards of the
ordinance applicable to parking facilities, and made reapplication for a building permit.
Defendant asserted the leased tract was not being put to its best use and denied the
permit in the exercise of its administrative discretion, whereupon relator sought a writ
of mandat6 to compel issuance of the permit. Held: a building permit must issue as a
matter of right upon full compliance with the applicable ordinance. The court said the
only discretion which is permissible in zoning matters is that exercised in adopting the
zoning classifications which must be of general applicability. The administration of a
zoning ordinance can only be concerned with questions of compliance with the standards
of the ordinance and not with the wisdom of the policy set forth in the ordinance.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Judgment N.O.V.-Inconsistent Testimony by the Same Witness
May Be Considered. In Halder v. Department of Labor and Indus-
tries,' the court qualified the- rule that a judgment notwithstanding
' 44 Wn2d 537, 268 P.2d 1020 (1954).
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